Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) is a recent and popular cloud computing paradigm in which the function provider specifies a function to be run and is billed only for the computational resources used by that function. Compared to other cloud paradigms, FaaS requires significantly more fine-grained measurement of functions' compute time and memory usage. Since functions are short and stateless, small ephemeral entities (e.g. individuals or underutilized data centers) can become FaaS service providers. However, this exacerbates the already substantial challenges of 1) ensuring integrity of computation, 2) minimizing information revealed to the service provider, and 3) accurately measuring computational resource usage.
INTRODUCTION
Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) is a recent paradigm in outsourced computation that has generated significant interest from cloud providers and developers. The function provider defines only the function itself (e.g. a JavaScript function) and the service provider orchestrates all the infrastructure necessary to run, scale, and loadbalance the computation. Functions can focus entirely on application logic, without needing to manage hardware or other resources.
Compared to Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), FaaS simplifies the task of the function provider who no longer needs to requisition a specific number of virtual machines (VMs) or install and maintain a full software stack. FaaS also improves efficiency for the service provider, who can now optimize the underlying infrastructure whilst only isolating individual functions. Instead of being billed to run a number of full-stack VMs, the function provider only pays for the computational resources used by the function. For example, Amazon Web Service (AWS) Lambda is billed on the number of function invocations and the time-integral of the function's memory usage (measured in Gigabyte-seconds) [5] .
In addition to large cloud providers, the short run-times and stateless nature of FaaS functions make it possible for smaller entities (e.g. data centres with spare capacity or individuals with powerful PCs) to become ephemeral FaaS service providers. The idea of outsourcing computation to individuals or small service providers has existed for many years, spawning successful projects like SETI@home [41] , Folding@home [21] , and ClimatePrediction.net [18] . However, these perform fixed computations, and on a voluntary basis. A new trend, evidenced by projects like the Golem network [22] , aims to support arbitrary computation and also to remunerate those who perform the computation.
Although any type of outsourced computing raises multiple security concerns, FaaS makes these more acute, especially in the case of small ephemeral service providers. In a typical FaaS deployment, the functions' inputs and outputs are directly visible to the service provider (e.g. the OpenWhisk platform stores these temporarily in a database), leading to confidentiality concerns. Furthermore, the function provider has no control of the underlying software stack, leading to integrity concerns. Function providers therefore place a significant amount of trust in the service provider, but this could be a significant challenge for small ephemeral service providers who cannot rely on reputational trust. We therefore require an architecture that provides strong security guarantees for FaaS services hosted by any service provider.
Orthogonally to the security concerns, the fine-grained subsecond resource measurements required for FaaS are significantly more difficult to audit than the coarse-grained billing of IaaS, where pricing is typically per VM per hour [4] . Again, whilst large wellestablished cloud providers can rely on reputational trust, small ephemeral service providers need mechanisms to prove that they are measuring resource usage accurately and billing accordingly.
To overcome these challenges, we present S-FaaS, an approach for providing security and accountability in FaaS using Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Our architecture encapsulates individual functions inside SGX enclaves, and uses remote attestation to provide various guarantees to relying parties. Specifically, S-FaaS guarantees the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the function inputs and outputs, and provides strong assurance to the client that the outputs are the result of a correct execution of the function. It also provides accountability by producing fine-grained measurements of each function's resource usage, which can be verified by both the service provider and function provider.
We provide a full implementation of S-FaaS in order to investigate the subtleties of such a design (e.g. integration into existing frameworks), and to evaluate its accuracy and performance overhead. The ability to accurately measure resource usage of SGX enclaves is a new and challenging problem, since it goes well beyond the current functionality provided by SGX. We develop a set of accurate and trustworthy resource measurement mechanisms for SGX enclaves, using Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX), which can be deployed on current hardware. We demonstrate these mechanisms in the context of FaaS, but they can also be used in various other SGX applications. We have integrated S-FaaS into the Apache OpenWhisk FaaS framework [6] , and provide this as open-source software. 1 In summary, we claim the following contributions:
• Design of S-FaaS: We develop an architecture that protects the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of function inputs and outputs, and provides clients with strong assurance that the outputs are the result of a correct execution of the specified function (Section 5). • SGX resource measurement: We present a set of reusable mechanisms for accurately measuring the compute time, memory, and network usage of a function executing inside an SGX enclave, in a manner that can be trusted by both the service provider and function provider (Section 6). • Implementation of S-FaaS: We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of the architecture and resource measurement mechanisms as part of the OpenWhisk FaaS framework (Section 7). We systematically evaluate the accuracy and latency overhead of our resource measurement mechanisms, as well as the overall latency overhead of S-FaaS (Section 8).
BACKGROUND 2.1 Function as a Service
In FaaS, the units of outsourced computation are small stateless functions, sometimes referred to as lambdas, that accept inputs and produce an output. FaaS functions are usually written in interpreted languages like Swift, Python, and Javascript. They are typically 1 Source code available at: https://github.com/SSGAalto/sfaas not able to make syscalls, but are provided with APIs to send and receive information via the network, allowing them to store and retrieve data from network storage and invoke other functions. An application can consist of multiple functions that call one another. Figure 1 shows a generalized overview of a FaaS scenario. The function provider provisions a function to be run on infrastructure operated by the service provider. The client invokes the function by supplying the required inputs, and receives the corresponding output. The service provider bills the function provider for the resources used by the function. The function provider determines which entities may invoke the function. Although Figure 1 only shows a single function invocation, this function can also call other functions, in which case the calling function becomes the client.
In IaaS, billing policies typically consider the number of hours for which a VM is running. In contrast, a single FaaS function may run for less than a second, thus necessitating very fine-grained resource measurements. Table 1 gives examples of different FaaS billing policies, based on the following types of measurements:
• Invocations: the number of times the function is called.
• Compute time: the execution time of the function multiplied by the frequency of the CPU, typically measured in GHz-seconds (GHz-s), which is dimensionally equivalent to CPU cycles. • Memory time-integral: the execution time of the function multiplied by the amount of memory used, measured in Gigabyteseconds (GB-s). This is calculated as either the maximum allowable memory, the maximum allocated memory, the average allocated memory, or the time-varying memory allocation. • Network usage: the amount of data sent or received, measured in Gigabytes (GB). 
Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) allows applications to instantiate isolated execution environments, called enclaves, containing application-defined code. An enclave runs as part of an application process (i.e. the host application), but data inside an enclave can only be accessed by code in the same enclave. Enclave code can only be called from untrusted code via well-defined call gates (ECALLs), and can call untrusted code (OCALLs). SGX therefore protects the integrity of enclave code and the confidentiality and integrity of enclave data against all other software on the platform. By design, enclave code can be interrupted by untrusted software (e.g. the OS scheduler) causing an Asynchronous Enclave Exit (AEX). After the interrupt, the host application can resume the enclave's execution using the ERESUME instruction. Critically, this AEX and ERESUME are transparent to the enclave's code.
Internally, an enclave allocates one or more Thread Control Structures (TCS) in protected memory. When a thread enters, it is associated with a free TCS, which it marks as busy and uses to store state information. The enclave allocates a stack of Save State Areas (SSAs) for each TCS. When a thread inside the enclave is interrupted, the CPU stores its register values in the corresponding SSA and fills the registers with synthetic contents before switching to untrusted code. When an enclave thread is resumed, the CPU reloads its registers from the SSA. Code inside the enclave can read and modify SSAs but cannot read the TCS.
Every enclave has an enclave identity (MRENCLAVE), which is a cryptographic hash of the enclave's initial code and configuration. Enclaves with the same code and configuration will have the same MRENCLAVE, even across different physical machines. SGX provides sealed storage by allowing each enclave to encrypt (i.e. seal) persistent data so that it can be stored outside the enclave. Data can be sealed such that it can only be unsealed by precisely the same enclave running on the same physical platform. SGX also provides remote attestation, a process through which an enclave can prove its identity (i.e. its MRENCLAVE value) to a remote verifier. Specifically, SGX creates a quote consisting of the enclave's identity and 16 bytes of user-defined data. This quote can be verified using the Intel Attestation Service (IAS).
Intel TSX
Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) [3] is an instruction set extension providing transactional memory support in hardware. It is designed to improve performance of concurrent programs by reducing the use of software-based lock primitives. TSX can be used inside SGX enclaves.
We focus on four TSX instructions: XBEGIN and XEND designate the beginning and end of a transactional region of code. XABORT aborts a currently executing transaction. XTEST is used to test if the thread is currently within a transaction. For each transaction, the CPU maintains a read-set and write-set, consisting of all data memory addresses (at cache-line granularity) read or written by the transaction. The CPU monitors accesses to these addresses by other threads, and will abort the transaction if any other thread writes to an address in the transaction's read-set. A transaction is also aborted by any asynchronous exception (e.g. an OS interrupt). If aborted, the CPU will not commit any writes from the transaction to memory. The CPU will execute the transaction's registered abort handler, which can decide whether to re-attempt the hardware transaction, or proceed to a fallback path.
THREAT MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
We assume the following two types of adversaries:
The service provider could be adversarial from the perspective of the function provider and the clients. This entity has the capability to run arbitrary software on the server platforms, including privileged software and SGX enclaves. Specifically, with full control of the OS, this entity can interrupt and resume enclaves at any time e.g. using the SGX-Step framework [45] to interrupt the enclave with single-instruction granularity. An adversarial service provider could have the following objectives:
• Learn the inputs and outputs of function invocations.
• Modify the inputs and outputs, or execute the function incorrectly. • Overcharge the function provider by falsely inflating resource usage measurements or making fake requests to the function.
The function provider could be adversarial from the service provider's perspective, and has the ability to provision arbitrary functions. We assume function providers are not adversarial from the clients' perspective, since clients choose to use their functions. This adversary aims to under-report resources used by the function.
Based on the above adversary capabilities and objectives, we define the following requirements: R1 Security: The service provider cannot learn or modify the inputs I or outputs O of a function invocation, and the client receives assurance that O is the result of a correct execution of the intended function F on the supplied I. R2 Resource measurement: The system produces an accurate measurement of the resource usage of each function invocation, which can be verified by both the service provider and function provider. The measurement includes the total execution time of the function, the time-integral of the function's memory usage, and the total network traffic sent and received by the function. R3 Functionality: Functions must be able to perform arbitrary computation and send and receive data over the network, which enables them to access networked storage and invoke other functions. Functions must ensure the appropriate level of security for their network communication (e.g. by using TLS).
Recently, various side-channel attacks have been demonstrated against SGX (e.g. [9, 13, 14, 34, 48] ), and multiple defenses proposed.
Integrating these state-of-the-art defenses will be an important engineering step before S-FaaS is used in production, but is not within the scope of this research paper.
DESIGN CHALLENGES
In this section we outline the principal challenges and the associated sub-challenges of securing a FaaS system using SGX.
Dynamic server utilization
Compared to existing cloud paradigms like IaaS, FaaS server utilization is significantly more dynamic. For example, the popular OpenWhisk FaaS framework can spawn a new worker environment for each function invocation on any available physical server. Furthermore, functions might only be provisioned to worker environments after the system receives an invocation request. This poses two main challenges for running functions in SGX enclaves.
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CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom C1 Encrypting client input: To achieve Requirement R1, the client's inputs must be encrypted before knowing which worker enclave will run the function. We therefore require a transferable state, consisting of a set of cryptographic keys, that can be distributed to any worker enclave. Since the service provider is potentially adversarial, we cannot trust this entity to store and distribute the state. To solve this, our architecture includes a new key distribution enclave (KDE) to securely generate and distribute the necessary keys to the dynamically created worker enclaves (Section 5.1).
C2 Attesting worker enclaves: Standard SGX attestation involves a multi-round-trip protocol to establish the identity of the enclave before any secrets are shared. This is not possible in FaaS because the worker might only be selected after the invocation request is received. Even if the client's input is encrypted using keys from the KDE, the client still needs to establish the same level of trust as if it had attested the worker enclave. We solve this using a transitive attestation scheme (Section 5.2).
Fine-grained resource measurement
Even if a function is run inside an SGX enclave, we still require an accurate and trustworthy mechanism to measure the enclave's compute time (Requirement R2).
C3 Measuring time in enclaves: SGX does not include any direct functionality to securely measure an enclave's execution time.
The rdtsc instruction returns the number of cycles since reset, but this value can be modified by a malicious OS or hypervisor [29] . The sgx_get_trusted_time function in the SGX SDK cannot be used because it requires the enclave to make an OCALL, which can be arbitrarily delayed by the OS. Furthermore, the OS can transparently interrupt the enclave at any point in its execution and wait for an arbitrary duration before resuming the enclave's execution. The latter two points can be used to subvert the SGX-based timing mechanism proposed in Vericount [44] . To solve this challenge, we develop a custom mechanism for measuring execution time inside the enclave using Intel TSX (Section 6.1).
C4 Isolating untrusted functions: One constraint of our timing mechanism is that it must be run in the same enclave as the function it measures, which gives rise to a second order challenge. To fulfil Requirement R2, both the service provider and function provider must be able to trust the timing measurement. This is challenging given that each may be adversarial from the other's perspective. Although SGX protects the measurement from manipulation by the service provider, it does not protect the measurement against malicious code supplied by the function provider running in the same enclave. To address this, we require in-enclave isolation such that the function cannot modify the resource measurement mechanisms (Section 5).
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
As shown in Figure 2 , our S-FaaS architecture on the service provider consists of one or more key distribution enclaves (KDEs) and multiple worker enclaves that run the functions and measure resource usage.
Key distribution enclave (KDE): To address challenges C1 and C2, we introduce a KDE. The KDE pre-generates key pairs and distributes the public keys to clients and the corresponding private keys to worker enclaves. For scalability reasons, a service provider may run multiple KDEs. Clients can be directed to any KDE, but client requests can only be processed by worker enclaves that have obtained keys from the same KDE used by the client.
Worker enclave: Worker enclaves expose an interface with five ECALLs (setup, init, timer, run, and finish), as described in Appendix A. The worker enclave must provide in-enclave isolation between the function and the resource measurement mechanisms running in the same enclave (challenge C4), for which there are two possible approaches:
1. Software fault isolation: Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [46] provides isolation between software modules in the same address space. The function itself need not be written in a memory-safe language because the SFI instrumentation restricts the function's memory accesses to a pre-defined range of enclave memory, which is disjoint from memory used by the resource measurement mechanisms. An additional library within the enclave would be used to allow the function to send/receive data over the network via a welldefined API. Examples of this type of isolation include Ryoan [27] , Google's Native Client (NaCl) [49] , and the SFI design by Shen et al. [42] using Intel Memory Protection Extensions (MPX).
2. Interpreter-based isolation: The alternative is to run the function inside an interpreter that naturally provides an isolation boundary. Again, the function itself need not be memory-safe so long as the interpreter mediates all memory accesses. The interpreter could be hardened to prevent runtime attacks that subvert this isolation barrier. The use of an interpreter also fits well with the overall FaaS paradigm for two reasons: 1) Since interpreted functions can be loaded after the enclave has been created, the service provider can create a pool of worker enclaves and perform key distribution before knowing which functions will be invoked.
2) FaaS functions are increasingly being written in higher-level interpreted languages, like JavaScript, to improve developer productivity. Examples of running interpreters inside enclaves include TrustJS [23] and ScriptShield [47] . Brenner et al. [12] present a detailed analysis of the efficiency of running different JavaScript interpreters in SGX enclaves to secure FaaS functions.
Note: In any outsourced computation, the service provider uses some form of isolation (e.g. VMs in IaaS) to protect its own infrastructure against third-party code. Since our in-enclave isolation already isolates third-party code, no additional isolation is needed, which improves efficiency for the service provider. Although our proof-of-concept implementation uses interpreter-based isolation (Section 7), S-FaaS can use any of the mechanisms described above.
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Key Distribution
The KDE pre-generates a key set, consisting of the following three asymmetric key pairs:
• A key agreement key k ka , used to authenticate the worker enclave to clients and establish a shared session key K with each client. • An output signing key k out , used to create a type of signed receipt indicating that the outputs are the result of a correct invocation of the executed function for the given inputs. This receipt can be verified by entities other than the client, and is only produced if requested by the client. • A resource measurement signing key k r es , used to sign the final resource measurement for each invocation of the function.
As shown in Figure 3 , the KDE distributes these keys to the worker enclaves. Depending on the service provider's configuration, the same keys can be provisioned to any number of worker enclaves. The KDE distributes the corresponding public keys to the function provider and clients. A client uses the public key agreement key k ka+ and her own key k c to generate a symmetric session key K (e.g. using elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement). The client sends her public key k c + and encrypts all other information under K, thus solving Challenge C1. If client authentication is required, this would be included in the function's inputs (e.g. an API key or authentication token).
Transitive Attestation
As explained in Challenge C2, in a typical FaaS deployment it is not possible for each client (or function provider) to attest the worker enclave for each function invocation. Instead, we use a new transitive attestation approach to allow clients to establish an equivalent level of trust as if they had attested the relevant worker enclave, whilst only attesting the KDE. When the KDE generates a new key set, it produces an SGX quote that can be verified using the Intel Attestation Service (IAS). This quote includes the enclave identity of the KDE (MRE K DE ) and the enclave identity of a specific type of worker enclave (MRE W E ), as well as the hashes of the three generated public keys. When a worker enclave requires its key set, the KDE attests the worker enclave, and checks that the attested identity matches MRE W E . The KDE will only distribute the private keys to worker enclaves with the correct identity. The service provider can also implement additional policies outside the KDE, e.g. ensuring keys can only be distributed to machines within the same data center.
When verifying the SGX quote, clients verify both the KDE and worker enclave identities. Specifically, they verify that a particular key set was generated by a valid KDE, and that the KDE will only distribute these keys to a specific type of worker enclave. They also verify that the worker enclave is running a trusted interpreter and resource measurement mechanisms. Therefore, although the attestation is transitive, the trust is not transitive because clients still verify the identity of the worker enclaves.
When one function calls another, this same protocol is used and the calling function programmatically verifies the attestation of the callee. The calling function knows the identity of the callee and can be provided with a list of trusted KDE identities, allowing it to call functions on other service providers.
Function Provisioning & Measurement
The function provider is assumed to have a business relationship with the service provider, including a means to authenticate itself (e.g. username and password, or public key). The service provider uses this to control who may provision functions. These intermediate steps are not shown in Figure 3 , but the overall result is that a function F is eventually provisioned to a worker enclave.
As the function runs, the resource measurement mechanisms monitor the function's resource usage. Once the function completes, these mechanisms finalize the measurements and output a data structure containing the metrics shown in Table 2 . Section 6 explains how we measure each of these quantities.
In addition, the function provides a fixed-size taд to be included in the resource measurement data structure. This can be used by the function provider to check that each resource measurement corresponds to a valid invocation of the function. For functions Finally, the worker enclave signs a hash of the complete resource measurement data structure using k r es . This signed measurement is eventually returned to the function provider, either immediately or at the end of a billing period.
Function Invocation & Output
Once a client has generated a symmetric session key K (Section 5.1) and verified the KDE's attestation (Section 5.2), she encrypts her inputs and sends them to the service provider. The client includes a hash of the intended function h(F ) in her encrypted input. The worker enclave first checks that this matches the hash of the loaded function, and if not, aborts the invocation before passing the decrypted inputs to the function. Unlike typical remote attestation systems, this additional check is necessary because the function is dynamically provisioned to the worker enclave after the worker enclave has been attested by the KDE. If omitted, a trivial attack is to redirect the client's input to a function that reveals all inputs.
The client includes a flag r to indicate whether the worker enclave should produce a receipt of the invocation, and a nonce n to associate the request and response. If requested, the enclave produces a receipt rec(I, F , O), signed using k out , certifying that the output O is the result of executing function F on input I. To facilitate billing policies in which the client pays for the computation, the client can also request to receive the resource measurements, and have a hash of this included in the receipt to preclude misbinding attacks. Once the function completes, the worker enclave returns the outputs, nonce, signed resource measurement, and receipt via the encrypted channels.
SGX RESOURCE MEASUREMENT 6.1 Compute Time
By far the most challenging quantity to measure is the execution time of the function's code within the enclave. There are various pitfalls of measuring this in the presence of a potentially adversarial OS, as assumed in our threat model (Section 3). Specifically, we cannot rely on OCALLs and must account for the possibility that the OS could cause an asynchronous enclave exit (AEX) at any time. We take a similar approach to the reference clock proposed by Chen et al. [16] , but adapt this for resource measurement purposes by ensuring that our timing mechanism will always provide a strict lower bound of the function's execution time.
The central idea is to use two concurrently executing threads per worker enclave: a worker thread that executes the function, and a timer thread that measures the time the worker thread spends inside the enclave. Specifically, we use the worker thread's sibling hyperthread to perform the timing measurements. As a result of various side-channel attacks, current state-of-the-art SGX defences require the service provider to disable hyperthreading or ensure that all enclave threads have benign sibling hyperthreads [15, 26, 38] . Since our timing mechanism makes use of these sibling hyperthreads that would otherwise be disabled or unused, it does not reduce the number of usable threads on HyperThreaded CPUs.
Our timer thread measures time as an integer number of time periods, each of duration τ CPU cycles. This is analogous to a clock where τ is the duration between clock ticks. The τ CPU cycles are in turn measured using a calibrated for loop. As we discuss in Section 6.1.5, τ is chosen by the service provider, but will always be reported in the signed resource measurements. The main challenge is that the timer thread must be able to check whether the worker thread has been interrupted. This would be trivial to check by reading the worker thread's TCS, but in the current version of SGX any explicit memory access to a TCS results in a Page-Fault exception [29] . To achieve this functionality with current hardware, we use Intel Transaction Synchronization Extensions (TSX) [3] .
6.1.1 Start and end of function. As shown in Figure 4 , when starting a new function invocation, the host application spawns two threads. With the first thread, it calls the timer ECALL, thus making this the timing thread. Once inside the enclave, the timing thread waits on a condition. With the second thread, the host application calls the run ECALL, making this the worker thread. We can use the trusted core reservation mechanism developed by Oleksenko et al. [38] to check that these are sibling hyperthreads. It is always in the service provider's interest to ensure that the timer thread is started before the worker thread.
Once inside the enclave, the worker thread places a special marker value in its current save state area (SSA). This is similar to the approach used by both Cloak [26] and Varys [38] to ensure two threads remain in the same enclave. The worker thread then resets t to zero, sets the enclave-wide proc flag to indicate that processing has started, and signals to the timer thread via the condition.
The timer thread acquires an enclave-wide mutex to ensure only one timer thread can be active at any given time. This prevents a malicious service provider from double-counting using multiple timer threads. The timer thread checks that the proc flag is set, and if so enters a TSX transaction. Within the transaction, the timer thread checks that the worker thread's SSA contains the marker value, which causes TSX to put the marker's address in the read-set of the transaction. The timer thread then executes a loop to count for a number of CPU cycles, defined by τ .
Once the loop completes, the timer thread increments its internal counter and exits the TSX transaction. Immediately after the transaction, the timer thread copies its internal counter to t. This avoids making t part of the transaction's write-set, which would cause timer transaction aborts if t were read from another thread (e.g. our memory measurement mechanism) during a transaction. If the proc flag is still set, the timer thread begins a new transaction repeating the above process. On completion of the function, the worker thread clears the proc flag, reads the final time value t = t max , and includes this in the authenticated resource measurement report.
One problem faced by Chen et al. [16] is that if the adversary can interrupt their reference clock thread between the end of the transaction and the increment of the clock variable (e.g. using SGX-
Step [45] ), he can cause the clock to lose time. Our design avoids this by making all timer thread interruptions detrimental to the service provider (i.e. under-reporting the function's compute time).
6.1.2 Worker thread interrupt. Sometimes the OS may legitimately need to interrupt the worker thread. We therefore require a way for the timer thread to detect this and pause the timer. When the worker thread is interrupted (i.e. an AEX event), the CPU saves the registers to the worker thread's SSA. This causes the timer's TSX transaction to abort, since the worker thread's SSA is in the transaction's read set. If the transaction is aborted, neither the internal counter nor t will be incremented for this partially completed tick. When the timer attempts to restart the transaction, it will detect that the worker thread has been interrupted because the SSA marker was overwritten by the AEX.
We also need the timer thread to detect when the worker thread has been resumed. Since ERESUME transparently restores the CPU registers from the SSA and resumes execution, it cannot signal to the timer thread. We overcome this by creating a custom ERESUME handler inside the enclave. Specifically, when the timer thread detects that the worker thread has been interrupted, it swaps out the instruction pointer (RIP) in the worker thread's SSA with the address of our custom handler. The original RIP is saved separately so that it can be accessed by our handler. Thus when the worker thread is resumed, it first executes our custom handler.
The custom handler recreates the marker in the worker thread's SSA and then continues executing the function from the point at which it was interrupted. However, since the ERESUME instruction has already restored all the registers from the SSA, our custom handler cannot clobber any argument registers. We therefore implement it in assembly to precisely control its behavior, as shown in Listing 2 in Appendix B.
6.1.3 Timer thread interrupt. As explained above, interrupting the timer thread is always detrimental to the service provider because it reduces the measured compute time. However, it may still be necessary for an honest service provider to interrupt the timer thread. If the timer thread was inside a transaction when interrupted, the transaction will be aborted. When the timer thread is resumed, it will simply continue with the timing loop as described above. No custom resume handler is required for the timer thread.
In rare cases, the OS may need to interrupt both the worker and timer threads concurrently. If the timer thread is resumed first, it will detect that the worker thread has been interrupted, based on the absence of the SSA marker, and will set up the custom ERESUME handler, as described above. If the worker thread is resumed first, it cannot notify the (interrupted) timer thread, so any compute time will not be measured until the timer thread is resumed and the worker thread is interrupted and resumed again. Neither scenario allows service providers to inflate the compute time measurement.
Worker thread OCALL.
To allow the worker thread to perform OCALLs, we instrument the OCALL code to pause the timer by clearing the proc flag. This does not interrupt the timer thread (i.e. it will complete the current tick). Although it is possible to interrupt the timer thread, this could be abused by a malicious function provider triggering frequent OCALLs to reduce the measured compute time. When the OCALL returns, our instrumentation sets the proc flag and signals to the timer thread to resume. 6.1.5 Choosing τ . We allow the service provider to choose τ independently for each worker enclave, based on their expected interrupt frequency. A shorter τ reduces the amount of under-reporting if a timer transaction is aborted, but also results in more frequent transactions, which could lead to under-reporting since the transaction setup time is not included in the measurement. This parameter cannot be changed after the enclave has been initialized, and is included in the authenticated resource measurement report. 6.1.6 Additional thread. As explained in Section 6.1, we use the worker thread's sibling hyperthread to perform the timing operations. For security reasons, this sibling hyperthread would otherwise be disabled or reserved for benign operations, which means that S-FaaS does not reduce the number of usable threads on CPUs with HyperThreading. On CPUs without HyperThreading, the service provider would need to dedicate at least one thread for timing purposes. However, in these cases, our worker enclaves could be modified to support multiple worker threads using a single timer thread. Although this would slightly decrease the accuracy of the timing (e.g. interrupting the timer thread when any worker thread is interrupted), it would amortize the cost of the timing thread over multiple worker threads.
Memory Usage
We measure both the the time-integral of the function's memory allocation (m int ) and the maximum instantaneous memory usage during the function's execution (m max ). The service provider can use either or both in their billing policy. We measure these by instrumenting the malloc, realloc, and free functions used by the function or interpreter. This ensures that any function code can only use these instrumented functions. We use m(t) to represent the current amount of memory allocated by the function at time t, and t mem to represent the time at which m(t) was last changed.
On any malloc, realloc, or free, we update m int and m max as follows: 1) Obtain the current value of t and subtract t mem from this to obtain the number of time periods since the previous change δt. 2) Multiply m(t) by δt and add the result to m int . 3) Increase or decrease m(t) by the amount of memory allocated or freed, and set t mem to the current value of t. 4) Check if the new m(t) value exceeds the previous maximum value m max and, if so, update m max . Since the function may terminate without explicitly freeing all its allocated memory, we perform a final integration step at the end of the function: we calculate the δt since the last t mem , multiply this by the final value of m(t), and add the result to m int .
Since we measure time in integer multiples of τ , we cannot consider intervals smaller than τ CPU cycles. This means that memory changes δm occurring between ticks are all treated as having occurred at the last tick. Depending on the behavior of the function, this could result in slightly over-or under-reporting m int . For example, memory allocated just before a tick will be treated as having been allocated nearly one tick earlier. Conversely, memory allocated and freed between two ticks will not be included in m int . This is an inherent limitation of using a time source with τ > 1. However, m max will always be precisely calculated, so if a function allocates and then frees a large memory area between ticks, this will still be visible in m max . We evaluate the accuracy of our measurement techniques in Section 8.2.
Our memory measurement mechanism focuses on dynamic memory allocation since this is likely to exhibit higher runtime variability compared to static allocation. Some interpreters (e.g. Duktape) use only heap-allocated memory for the function, which would be fully accounted for by our current mechanisms. Even if an interpreter uses stack-based allocation, it would be possible to instrument the interpreter to apply similar measurement techniques (e.g. periodically recording stack usage).
Network Usage
Networking calls from inside the enclave are passed to the untrusted environment via an OCALL. After the OCALL resumes, the total number of bytes sent and received is added to the network usage metric before the output of the networking call is returned to the function. We assume that network connections are secured using TLS connections (or equivalent), which terminate inside the enclave (e.g. RA-TLS [33] ). Thus a malicious service provider who corrupts/forges network packets would simply cause connection termination (i.e. denial-of-service). This is an orthogonal problem to S-FaaS because, even with an honest service provider, an upstream router could corrupt and/or delay network packets.
IMPLEMENTATION IN OPENWHISK
We integrated our S-FaaS architecture and resource measurement mechanisms in the Apache OpenWhisk [6] FaaS framework in order to demonstrate that our architecture is compatible with existing frameworks, and evaluate its overall performance impact. Open-Whisk supports functions written in various languages, including JavaScript/NodeJS, Swift, Python, and Java. It also supports custom logic in Docker containers. To integrate S-FaaS with OpenWhisk, we created a new Docker image containing our worker enclave.
Function Invocation: When a client submits a request, Open-Whisk initially stores this in a database of pending requests until it can be dispatched to a suitable worker. In S-FaaS, this input is already encrypted, as explained in Section 5, but this does not require modification of OpenWhisk. To handle this request, OpenWhisk creates a new Docker container, which initializes the worker enclave. As explained in Section 5, if a sealed key set is not already available, the worker enclave contacts the provisioning enclave and requests the necessary keys. Once a key set has been provisioned to a particular platform, we store the sealed key set locally and make this available to all Docker containers on the platform. The worker enclave then processes the request as usual, and produces the output encrypted for the client. OpenWhisk stores this in a database until it is sent to the client. The signed resource measurements produced by S-FaaS can also be stored in this database and sent to the function provider for billing purposes.
Isolation: As explained in Section 5, we require an isolation barrier within the enclave to prevent the function from modifying our resource measurement mechanisms. In our proof of concept implementation, we use a JavaScript interpreter to provide this isolation. Similarly to Milutinovic et al. [37] and Brenner et al. [12] , we use the Duktape [20] JavaScript interpreter because of its portable design and low memory footprint. We configured Duktape to use our instrumented malloc() and free() functions, and modified the networking API to marshal data into/out of the enclave before sending/receiving network packets via the host's network interface. However, we could have used any suitable interpreter, including MuJS as used by Goltzsche et al. [23] and Google's V8 as evaluated by Brenner et al. [12] , or any other suitable isolation mechanism, such as Ryoan [27] or Google's Native Client (NaCl) [49] .
EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the security, measurement accuracy, and performance overhead of S-FaaS. To meet Requirement R1, the service provider must be prevented from learning or modifying the inputs or outputs of a function invocation, and the client must receive assurance that received output O is the result of a correct execution of the intended function F on the supplied inputs I. As explained in Section 5.2, our transitive attestation protocol provides the equivalent level of assurance as if the client had directly attested the specific worker enclave. After attesting the key distribution enclave (KDE), the client can therefore trust that only a worker enclave with the correct MRENCLAVE value will have access to the key set published by the KDE. The use of authenticated encryption protects both the confidentiality and integrity of the client's inputs in transit. Even if the service provider provisions an incorrect function, the worker enclave will detect the mismatch based on the hash of the intended function included in the client's input. If the service provider replays a previous output to the client, the client will detect this because the nonce in the output will not match the nonce the client included in the encrypted input. Even if the client accidentally reuses nonces, any manipulation of I, F , or O would be visible in the signed receipt. Similar arguments apply for the function provider establishing the trustworthiness of a worker enclave and checking the veracity of a resource measurement report produced by the enclave (Requirement R2).
Various side-channel attacks e.g. [9, 13, 34, 48] and defenses e.g. [15, 16, 26, 40] have been proposed for SGX. This is an active area of research. Integrating state-of-the-art side-channel defenses would be an important step when using S-FaaS in production. Nevertheless, we note that three state-of-the-art defenses against cache side-channel attacks, Cloak [26] , HyperRace [15] , and Varys [38] , all require that the attacker is prevented from controlling the sibling hyperthread. Our timer thread can fulfil this requirement.
Resource measurement integrity:
As explained in Section 5, the in-enclave isolation in the worker enclave protects the integrity of our resource measurement mechanisms against the function. Therefore, even a malicious function provider cannot interfere with the timing thread, evade the instrumented memory management functions, or modify the internal state of any of these mechanisms. Conversely, the enclave protects the resource measurement mechanisms against a malicious service provider. Although the service provider can always interrupt either the timer or worker thread, this is never in the service provider's interest, as explained in Section 6. On current SGX CPUs, the turbo frequency is always the same for all active cores, meaning that an adversary cannot subvert the timing measurements using frequency scaling. If future CPUs support per-core frequency-scaling, additional checks (e.g. similar to Cloak [26] or HyperRace [15] ) could be used to ensure both the work and timer threads run on the same core. For memory measurement, if the service provider does not allocate the expected memory, the function would likely crash without producing a resource measurement report, which is also not in the service provider's interest. For network measurement, since we measure the exact payloads sent and received inside the enclave, a malicious service provider cannot inflate this measurement by dropping packets or causing TCP re-transmissions, since these would be handled by the TCP stack outside the enclave. Therefore, S-FaaS fulfils Requirement R2.
TCB size:
Excluding SGX trusted libraries and the JavaScript interpreter, our resource measurement mechanisms add approximately 731 lines of C++ code (LoC) to the worker enclave. Our KDE consists of only 195 LoC. Thus the critical S-FaaS code is amenable to security audits or formal verification. Although we use the Duktape JavaScript interpreter in our implementation (65 kLoC), we emphasize that this is purely to demonstrate S-FaaS functionality (e.g. replicating the setup of Milutinovic et al. [37] ). When used in production, the service provider would naturally select an interpreter that most clients trust, otherwise clients would use a different service provider. The service provider could either select an interpreter with a small TCB (e.g. the 4 kLoC MuJS used by Goltzsche et al. [23] ) or a purpose-build SGX sandbox like Ryoan [27] .
Damage containment:
By default, all worker enclaves have the same MRENCLAVE, so if one worker enclave were compromised it would be able to unseal keys for different functions in other worker enclaves. To mitigate this risk, S-FaaS can be configured to provide damage containment by parametrizing the worker enclaves, either by function or by client. Since this parametrization changes the MRENCLAVE, the enclave is restricted to certain functions or clients. Data sealed by a parametrized enclave is thus protected against enclaves with different parametrization or nonparametrized enclaves. The service provider can use this mechanism to balance between flexibility (i.e., the ability to run any task on any worker enclave) and damage containment. The parametrization can also be applied selectively, e.g. creating a set of parametrized worker enclaves for a large customer, and a set of general-purpose worker enclaves for other customers.
Measurement Accuracy
We evaluate the accuracy of our compute time, memory, and network usage measurements by running synthetic benchmark functions with known characteristics. To evaluate compute time and memory, we use a synthetic Fibonacci function that takes a single integer n as an input parameter. This function calculates the first n + 1 numbers in the Fibonacci sequence and stores them in a preallocated list Both the time and memory complexity are therefore O(n) in the input parameter. A simplified version of this function is shown in Listing 3 in Appendix C. Figure 5 shows the measured time (y-axis) for different values of the input parameter (x-axis), with different values of τ . Although we did not explicitly interrupt the worker thread, the normal OS scheduling still caused some interrupts during these tests. For comparison, we also measured the total runtime of the ecall_run ECALL from outside the enclave (outside enclave in Figure 5 ). Although the time measured outside the enclave also includes the ECALL, this is negligible in comparison to the runtime of the function. Given that the time complexity of our Fibonacci function is O(n) in the input parameter, it would be expected that the time increases linearly with the input parameter. As shown in Figure 5 , for all values of τ our measured values exhibit linear behavior in the input parameter. As expected, choosing low values of τ results in slight under-reporting, as explained in Section 6.1.5. Figure 6 shows the average values of m int for different values of the input parameter. Given that both the time and memory complexity of our Fibonacci function are O(n) in the input parameter, it would be expected that the time-integral of memory m int increases quadratically with the input parameter, as Figure 6 shows. As with the timing measurement, very low values of τ result in under-reporting. Although it is not straight-forward to perform the same measurement from outside the enclave, we confirmed the validity of our m int measurements by dividing the measured m int values by t max to obtain the time-averaged memory usage, and confirmed that this increases linearly in the input parameter.
To test network usage, we created a synthetic known_network function that sends and receives a specified number of bytes via the network. In all cases, the enclave's resource measurement mechanism correctly measured the number of bytes sent/received. Our resource measurement mechanisms therefore fulfil Requirement R2.
Performance
As explained in Section 6.1.6, our use of sibling hyperthreads for resource measurement does not reduce the number of threads available for computation. However, since CPU resources like L1/L2 caches are shared between sibling hyperthreads, our resource measurement mechanisms might still impact the performance of the worker threads, which would manifest as latency overhead for the functions. Using our prototype implementation, we evaluated two kinds of latency overhead: 1) the impact of our resource measurement mechanisms, and 2) the overall impact of integrating S-FaaS 
Resource Measurement Latency:
To quantify the latency increase of our resource measurement mechanisms on the function, we used several benchmark functions from the Octane [25] JavaScript benchmark suite. This same benchmark suite is used by the developers of the Duktape interpreter to compare performance between versions and other interpreters. We excluded some benchmarks that are not realistic use cases of FaaS (e.g. displaying graphics). The functionality of each benchmark is described in the Octane benchmark reference [25] . We ran each benchmark for three different scenarios. In the first, the inputs and outputs are not encrypted. This would be used during incremental deployment of S-FaaS, or for clients who do not require encryption. In the second, the inputs and outputs are encrypted, and in the third, the client additionally requests a signed receipt of the function's execution, as explained in Section 5. In all cases, S-FaaS provides a signed resource measurement report. As a baseline, we compare these measurements against the same Duktape interpreter, running inside an SGX enclave, with no input/output encryption or resource measurement (i.e. the environment used by Milutinovic et al. [37] ). All measurements are the average of 10 runs.
As shown in Table 3 , the average overhead of our S-FaaS resource measurement over the benchmark suite ranges from 5.3% without encryption to 6.3% with full encryption and a signed transaction receipt. The resource measurement overhead includes any additional time required to initialize and synchronize the worker and timer threads and to generate the signed resource measurement report.
Pre-function latency:
To quantify the additional end-to-end latency of invoking a function, we measured the response time of an empty function with and without S-FaaS in both cold-start and warm-start scenarios. We use the most conservative interpretation of cold-start by assuming there are no S-FaaS Docker containers or worker enclaves running. Other cold-start benchmarks may assume already-running containers that have yet to be initialized with a specific function. Our measurements therefore include the time to start the Docker container, initialize the worker enclave, unseal the key set, load the interpreter, provision the function, marshal the inputs into the enclave, perform the client key agreement, decrypt the inputs, and return the result to the client.
For frequently used functions, it is likely that the system would already have a Docker container and worker enclave loaded for the specific function, resulting in a significantly faster warm-start. In this case, the measurement includes only the time to marshal the inputs into the worker enclave, perform the key agreement with the client, decrypt the inputs, and return the result to the client.
Since we are using an empty function, these measurements are independent of the specific function invoked, and thus constitute a fixed latency overhead of using S-FaaS with OpenWhisk. As a baseline, we use the same Duktape JavaScript interpreter, running inside a native OpenWhisk container. All measurements are the average of 10 runs. As shown in Table 4 , S-FaaS adds less than 3% additional latency before the function.
Case-study: ConvNetJS
As a full case study, we ported ConvNetJS [1] , a neural network library written in JavaScript, into S-FaaS. We measured the forward propagation time through a convolutional layer for various sizes of input tensor. This represents a typical FaaS workload in that it is a short-running stateless transformation from input to output. Similarly to the Octane microbenchmarks (Table 3) , we evaluated the performance of S-FaaS under three different scenarios: 1) No encryption of inputs or outputs; 2) Encrypted inputs and outputs; 3) Encrypted inputs and outputs as well as a signed receipt of the function's execution. In all cases, S-FaaS provides a signed resource measurement report. As a baseline, we compare against the same Duktape interpreter, running inside an SGX enclave, with no input/output encryption or resource measurement (i.e. the same environment as used by Milutinovic et al. [37] ). All measurements are the average of 10 runs, and are shown in Table 5 . As indicated by even the baseline measurements, ConvNetJS is slower than stateof-the-art approaches for running neural network workloads in SGX, which typically use compiled languages. However, for the purposes of this case study, Table 5 shows that our cryptographic operations and resource measurement mechanisms add less than 3.4% latency overhead.
DISCUSSION
Given the challenges we faced in designing and implementing S-FaaS, we propose a wish list of improvements to the current SGX design. We only include suggestions that do not overtly require significant changes to the current SGX design. Secure tick count: As explained in Section 38.6.1 of the Intel Software Developer's Manual [29] , reading the CPU tick counter using the RDTSC instruction is only supported in SGX2. However, even if accessible, this cannot be used for resource measurements because its value can be manipulated by privileged system software outside the enclave (e.g. the hypervisor can virtualize this tick counter and provide different values to different VMs). If SGX enclaves had access to a secure tick counter that could not be manipulated by untrusted software, S-FaaS could use this instead of our calibrated loop. ERESUME handler: Even with a secure tick counter, the timing mechanism would still need a way to detect asynchronous enclave exists and transparent ERESUME events. If the enclave could specify a custom ERESUME handler, similar to our design in section 6.1.2, this could be used to account for these events. To accurately measure time spent inside the enclave, this handler would still need to know when the enclave was interrupted. This could be achieved by having the CPU store the current value of the secure tick counter in the thread's SSA when the enclave is interrupted. Upon ERESUME, the custom handler could simply calculate the time for which the enclave was interrupted. This custom ERESUME handler could also be used to enhance the security of enclaves in other ways. For example, it could monitor the frequency of enclave interrupts, similarly to the Déjà vu system by Chen et al. [16] .
Concurrently with our work, Oleksenko et al. [38] proposed similar SGX hardware enhancements to improve the efficiency of Varys, their system for defending against side-channel attacks on SGX enclaves. This indicates that the above enhancements could benefit multiple different types of systems. We discuss additional deployability considerations in Appendix D.
RELATED WORK
Resource measurement: Tople et al. [44] proposed Vericount, a system for measuring resource usage of SGX enclaves. Similarly to S-FaaS, Vericount places the resource measurement mechanism within the same enclave as the code to be measured, and measures compute time, memory, network bandwidth, and I/O resources used by the enclave. It protects the resource measurement code from other code within the enclave using software fault isolation (SFI) techniques. However, Vericount cannot be directly used in the FaaS context for two reasons: firstly, given our adversary model, Vericount's mechanism for measuring compute time could be arbitrarily inflated by an adversarial service provider, and secondly its mechanism for measuring memory usage is too coarse-grained for the FaaS context.
To measure compute time, Vericount instruments every ECALL to read and store the starting time using the SGX trusted time function (sgx_get_trusted_time) provided by the SGX SDK. Before the ECALL returns, the same function is again called to obtain the end time. Additionally, the start and end times of each OCALL are also recorded using the same timing API. The total time spent inside the enclave can thus be calculated from the start and end times of the ECALL, minus the time spent on OCALLs. In our adversary model, the service provider could interrupt the enclave without causing an OCALL. This type of interrupt triggers an Asynchronous Session: Trusted Execution Environments CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom Enclave Exit (AEX), from which the enclave can later be resumed using the ERESUME instruction. However, since AEX events are not accounted for in Vericount, the time for which the enclave is interrupted will be included in the total CPU time. Furthermore, the SGX trusted time function itself causes an OCALL, since the time value is provided by an architectural enclave. Once control has been transferred to the malicious OS through this OCALL, the OS can delay the request arbitrarily. For memory usage, Vericount records only the maximum allowed enclave memory, but does not measure the enclave's actual memory allocation. This is likely too coarse-grained for the FaaS context, because the memory requirements of a single function may vary significantly between invocations depending on the size of the input. Since the enclave's maximum memory is statically defined during initialization, a function provider would have to either pay for the maximum memory allocation for every function invocation, or provide multiple enclaves with different maximum memory sizes.
Measuring time: One solution to the timing problem is the reference clock designed by Chen et al. [16] as part of the Déjà vu system. They were the first to suggest using TSX to measure time within an enclave, and they use this to measure the time between selected basic blocks of the enclave's code. An unusually long execution time between basic blocks indicates that one or more AEXs have occurred, and this can be used to detect side-channel attacks. In comparison to our resource measurement mechanism, the main difference is that Déjà vu aims to implement an accurate clock whereas we aim to implement an accurate lower bound timer that can be used as the basis for billing policies. This gives rise to two fundamental differences: Firstly, for the reference clock, it is important to detect interruption of the reference clock thread, which they achieve by randomizing the number of CPU cycles in each transaction. In contrast, we use a calibrated fixed τ , so that this can be reported to the function provider. As we explain in Section 6, it is not in the service provider's interest to interrupt our timing thread. Secondly, whereas Déjà vu instruments selected basic blocks to read the reference clock when executed, we use TSX to detect when the worker thread is interrupted and pause our timer.
Counting instructions: Instead of measuring time in CPU cycles, Zhang et al. [50] propose to count the number of instructions executed within the enclave to create a Proof of Useful Work. They reserve a register for instruction counting and instrument the start of each basic block to increase the count by the number of instructions in the block. Although counting instructions is sufficient for their purpose, they acknowledge that counting CPU cycles is a more accurate metric of CPU effort because it measures the actual time used (e.g. instruction times vary depending on whether data is in the cache). Similarly, Oleksenko et al. [38] use a rough count of instructions to estimate the frequency of AEX events to detect side-channel attacks. Again, counting instructions is sufficiently accurate for this purpose, but when they require fine-grained timing, they spawn an enclave thread and increment a global variable in a tight loop. However, all instruction counting approaches require the service provider to be able to inspect all enclave code to ensure it has been correctly instrumented. Unlike our resource measurement mechanisms, this makes them incompatible with techniques like SGXElide [7] and Intel's Protected Code Loader [30] that allow encrypted code to be loaded into the enclave.
Other uses of TSX: Shih et al. [43] also use TSX to defend against page-fault side-channel attacks. Specifically, their T-SGX system encapsulates sensitive enclave code in a TSX transaction and leverages the property that errors (e.g. page faults) occurring within a transaction are not reported to the underlying OS, thus making known controlled-channel attacks impractical.
Gruss et al. [26] use TSX to defend against cache side-channel attacks. Their key insight is that a TSX transaction requires all memory it accesses to remain in the CPU caches for the duration of the transaction. A premature eviction of some memory results in a transaction abort. Code that exhibits secret-dependent control flow or data memory accesses is typically vulnerable to cache-base side channel attacks. By encapsulating code in TSX transactions, their Cloak system ensures that if a transaction completes, all sensitive code and data must have remained in the CPU caches, otherwise the transaction would abort and roll back any memory changes.
Securing outsourced computation: Rutkowska [31] recently described work towards running arbitrary payloads in SGX enclaves in the context of the Golem network that outsources computation to individuals. This is complementary to S-FaaS, and could use our mechanisms for accurately and reliably measuring and reporting resource consumption from these small ephemeral service providers.
Schuster et al. [39] and Dinh et al. [19] presented systems for securing map-reduce computations using SGX, and Brenner et al. [11] presented a design for running Java-based Vert-x micro services in SGX enclaves. Whereas these systems focus on distributing a given workload over multiple nodes, S-FaaS focusses on supporting multiple clients each interacting with a single TEE.
In the context of FaaS, Brenner et al. [12] present a detailed analysis of the efficiency aspects of running either Duktape or Google's V8 JavaScript engine in an SGX enclave. This is complementary to our work, and could be combined with our transitive attestation protocol and trustworthy resource measurement mechanisms.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The emerging FaaS paradigm provides numerous benefits and allows small ephemeral entities to become service providers. However, this significantly exacerbates the challenges of 1) ensuring the integrity of outsourced computation, 2) minimizing the information revealed to the service provider, and 3) accurately measuring and reliably reporting computational resource usage.
We introduce S-FaaS, the first architecture to provide trustworthy resource measurement in SGX enclaves. We have demonstrated that our architecture supports existing FaaS workflows by integrating it into OpenWhisk and porting the ConvNetJS library. Our experimental evaluation shows that S-FaaS can accurately and reliably measure compute time, memory, and network usage, whilst incurring minimal overhead. Our techniques can also be applied to domains beyond FaaS, which we plan to investigate as future work.
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CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom latter. Running S-FaaS in the secure world would still require a suitable sandbox to constrain the function, but could potentially use a simpler timing approach if the secure world has access to a secure tick counter. Although TrustZone itself does not provide remote attestation, this functionality is typically provided by the vendor of the secure world's trusted OS. Brenner et al. [10] have proposed TrApps, an architecture for securing general-purpose cloud workloads using ARM TrustZone, which could make use of our resource measurement mechanisms. Integration with Smart Contracts: Various approaches have been proposed to improve security, privacy, performance, and efficiency of smart contracts by performing certain computations inside TEEs [8, 17, 32, 36] . However, none of these describe how the service providers operating the TEEs are compensated for the use of their (often scarce) computational resources. More broadly, the idea of using smart contracts to pay for outsourced computation has only recently begun to be explored. For example, the Golem network [22] uses Ethereum-based transactions to settle payments between users and providers of outsourced computation. However, it is unclear how accountability is achieved in this setting.
Since our S-FaaS resource measurements can be automatically verified, these can be used directly in smart contracts to enable decentralized payment for outsourced computation. For example, the billing policy could be instantiated as a smart contract that transfers funds to the service provider at a pre-agreed rate after presentation of a correctly signed and attested function receipt. Using this type of smart contract without verifiable resource consumption measurements could lead to over-charging by service providers, or disputes that must be manually resolved.
Automated decentralized payment is particularly important for allowing small ephemeral service providers (e.g. individuals) to enter the market. Since these small entities cannot in general rely on the reputation-based trust enjoyed by established cloud providers, S-FaaS enables them to prove that they will perform the computation securely and measure resource usage correctly.
Other use cases: In addition to automated decentralized billing, verifiable resource usage measurements can also be used for other purposes. For example, Zhang et al. [50] and the Ankr network [2] have both proposed using TEEs to perform useful computations as a mechanism for leader elections (e.g. to decide which node will mine the next block in a blockchain). The more computations a miner performs, the greater their chance of mining the next block. S-FaaS could also be used for this purpose.
